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Some  critics  argue  that  the  type  of  psychiatric  diagnosis  found  in  the
DSM  and  ICD  are  superfluous  and  should  be  abandoned.  These  are
known  as  categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnoses.  To  receive  a
categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnosis  an  individual  need  only
exhibit  some,  rather  than  all,  of  the  symptoms  on  the  diagnostic
criteria.  Consequently,  categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnoses  only
associate  an  individual  with  a  range  of  symptoms  rather  than  specify
which  symptoms  they  have.  Drawing  upon  Ronald  Giere’s  account  of
scientific  models,  I  portray  categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnoses
as  abstract  models  which  guide  the  building  of  less  abstract  models.
These  models  can  specify  which  symptoms  a  particular  individual  has.
Additionally,   categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnoses  can  guide
investigation  of  symptoms  towards  difficult  to  spot  symptoms,  guide
investigation   towards   changing  symptoms   and  guide   investigation
towards   how   symptoms   manifest.   These   important   roles   mean
categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnoses  should  not  be  abandoned.
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1  Introduction
Psychiatric   diagnoses   made   using   the   main   diagnostic   manuals,   the   DSM
(Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual)  and  the  ICD  (International  Classification  of
Disease)  are  examples  of  categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnoses.  These  manuals
classify  people  into  categories;  an  individual  either  meets  or  fails  to  meet  a
particular  set  of  diagnostic  criteria.  There  is  a  long  history  of  scepticism  over
categorical  psychiatric  diagnoses  (as  opposed  to  other  types  of  psychiatric  diagnosis,
such  as  dimensional  or  psychodynamic  diagnoses).  One  particular  concern  of  critics
is  that  categorical  psychiatric  diagnoses,   or  at  least   some  specific  categorical
psychiatric  diagnoses,  are  superfluous.  In  many  cases,  to  receive  a  categorical
psychiatric  diagnosis  an  individual  only  needs  to  exhibit  some  rather  than  all  the
symptoms  listed  in  the  diagnostic  criteria.  Their  diagnostic  criteria  is  polythetic,
meaning  that  there  is  more  than  one  way  an  individual  can  meet  the  diagnostic
criteria  and  thus  qualify  for  that  categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnosis.  For
example,  a  diagnostic  criteria  might  require  five  symptoms  from  a  list  of  nine  and
so  two  different  people  can  meet  that  diagnostic  criteria  despite  only  having  one
shared  symptom.  This  means  that  people  with  the  same  categorical  polythetic
psychiatric  diagnosis  can  have  quite  different  symptoms,  and  so  knowing  what
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categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnosis  someone  has  been  assigned  only  gives  a
poor  indication  of  what  symptoms  they  have.  Those  who  want  to  know  what
symptoms  a  person  with  a  categorical  polythetic  diagnosis  actually  manifests  will
need  to  take  additional  steps  to  find  out;  they  will  need  to  ask  that  person  or
observe  them.  This  leads  critics  to  see  categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnoses
as  contributing  nothing  that  cannot  be  established,  with  much  greater  accuracy,
through  directly  learning  what  symptoms  an  individual  exhibits.  It  is,  of  course,
possible  to  learn  both  which  categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnosis  someone
has  and  which  symptoms  they  have  but  this  seems  to  leave  categorical  polythetic
psychiatric  diagnoses  as  superfluous  (Boyle  [1990],  p.83;  Cromby  et  al  [2015],
p.116;  Johnstone  [2018],  p.39;  Kinderman  et  al.  [2013],  p.3;  Latif  [2016],  p.290;
Runswick-Cole  [2016],  p.27;  Vanheule  [2017],  p.85).  I  respond  to  the  claim  that
categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  superfluous  because  they  do  not
reveal   which   symptoms  an   individual   exhibits.   I   will   argue   that   categorical
polythetic  psychiatric  diagnoses  can  make  a  positive  contribution  to  understanding
which  symptoms  someone  exhibits  and  make  a  contribution  to  understanding  how
they  exhibit  those  symptoms.1  For  convenience,  I  shall  use  the  acronym  CPPD  to
refer  to  categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnoses.
I  shall  frame  CPPDs  in  terms  of  Ronald  Giere's  account  of  scientific  models
([1994];  [  2004];  [2010]).  Giere  is  a  philosopher  of  science  who  has  pioneered  an
account  of  scientific  theories  and  models  which  accommodates  their  abstract  nature.
He  shows  how  scientific  theories  are  abstract.  Newton's  laws,  for  example,  do  not
accommodate  factors  like  wind  speed,  friction  and  shape.  Giere  outlines  how
scientific  theories  lack  this  specific  detail  but  guide  building  more  specific  models
1 The  word  ‘diagnosis’  gets  used  in  slightly  different  ways  by  different  mental  health  researchers  
and  professionals.  Some  hold  quite  a  broad  understanding  of  diagnosis,  and  would  consider  a  
‘diagnosis’  to  include  a  full  consideration  of  psychological  processes  and  life  problems.  There  
are  also  dimensional  diagnoses  whereby  someone  is  diagnosed  as  having  one  or  more  attribute  
to  a  particular  degree.  Superfluity  is  considered  a  problem  of  categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  
diagnoses  rather  than  other  approaches  to  psychiatric  diagnosis.  Consequently,  the  sole  type  of  
diagnosis  I  focus  upon  in  this  article  is  categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnosis.  
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which  accommodate  this  detail.  Following  this,  I  will  present  an  account  according
to  which  CPPDs  operate  by  (i)   abstracting  away  from  details  regarding  the
symptoms  of   actual   diagnosed  people,   and  (ii)   can   be   used   to   guide   the
development  of  more  specific  models  that  would  incorporate  these  details.  The
function   that   CPPDs   play   in   model   construction   means   they   can   facilitate
understanding  what  behaviour  and  symptoms  an  individual  exhibits.  This  means
CPPDs  play  an  important  role  and  therefore  should  not  be  abandoned.  Other
authors  have  previously  employed  Giere's  philosophy  of  science  in  thinking  about
psychiatry  (Heinrichs  [2015];  Murphy  [2006])  and  non-psychiatric  medicine  (Simon
[2008]).  However,  the  notion  that  CPPDs  can  guide  symptom  attribution  has  not
been  developed  previously.  
A  critic  might  believe  all  possible  CPPDs  are  superfluous,  or  they  might
believe  that  all  currently  employed  (but  potentially  not  alternative)  CPPDs  are
superfluous,  or  they  might  focus  upon  claiming  particular  CPPDs  are  superfluous.  I
will  argue  that  the  degree  to  which  any  particular  CPPD  is  either  superfluous  or
non-superfluous  will  be  case  specific.  In  this  paper  I  shall  illustrate  my  arguments
through  considering  the  CPPD  Autism  Spectrum  Disorders  (henceforth  ASD). 2  I
show  that,  in  contrast  to  critics  who  target  ASD  (Timini  et  al.  [2011],  p.1;  Hassal
[2016],   p.51;   Latif   [2016],   p.290;   Runswick-Cole  [2016],   p.27),   it   is   not   a
superfluous  CPPD.  I  return  later  in  this  paper  to  consider  the  ways  in  which  ASD
functions  like  and  unlike  other  CPPDs.  I  suggest  that  the  conclusions  I  draw  from
analysing  ASD  will  be  generalisable  to  a  significant  number  of,  though  not  all,
CPPDs.  
I  start,  in  section  2,  by  outlining  the  concerns  that  CPPDs  are  superfluous.
In  section  3  I  outline  Giere’s  account  of  scientific  models.  I  then  use  his  account,
in   section   4,   to   show  how  CPPDs   can   provide   guidance   which   enhances
understanding  of  symptoms  in  three  different  helpful  ways.  
2 The  CPPDs  which  were  previously  referred  to  as  autism  and  Asperger’s  syndrome  are  called  
ASD  since  the  latest  edition  of  the  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  (DSM-5).
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2  Categorical  Polythetic  Psychiatric  Diagnoses  
At  its  most  basic  a  CPPD  (as  found  in  the  DSM  and  ICD)  is  a  name  given  to  a
cluster  of  symptoms  which  can  occur  together  in  an  individual.  For  each  CPPD,
the  DSM  and  ICD  provides  a  set  of  diagnostic  criteria  which  must  be  met  to
receive  that  CPPD.  This  typically  consists  of  one  or  more  lists  of  symptoms.  An
individual  must  exhibit  a  certain  number  of  symptoms  from  each  list  to  receive  the
CPPD.  For  example,  the  diagnostic  criteria  for  ASD  in  DSM-5  consists  of  two
lists.  The  first  list  covers  abnormal  social  communication  and  interaction,  including
both  verbal  and  non-verbal  communications.   The  second  list   covers  repetitive
behaviour,   interests   and  activities,   including  rigid  thinking  and  hyperactive  or
hyporeactive  sensory  input  (APA  [2013],  pp.50—1).  An  individual  must  exhibit  a
number  of  symptoms  from  each  list  to  be  diagnosed  with  ASD.  The  diagnostic
criteria  sometimes  also  have  exclusion  criteria  which  specify  whether  that  CPPD
should  be  given  to  an  individual  who  also  meets  the  diagnostic  criteria  of  certain
other  CPPDs  (for  example,  a  diagnosis  of  ASD  and  schizophrenia  cannot  be  given
to  the  same  individual  even  though  both  have  some  similarity  of  symptoms  such  as
social  impairments  and  unusual  interests  (APA  [2013],  p.58)).  
There  are  various  potential  advantages  to  CPPDs.  Firstly,  CPPDs  demarcate
people  into  various  groups  which  have  associated  clinical  pictures.  This  can  help
practitioners  communicate  about  patients,  it  can  help  other  people  understand  the
person  with  the  CPPD  and  can  increase  the  self  understanding  of  that  individual
(Maung  [2019],  p.510;  Sadler  [2005],  p.66).  Secondly,  CPPDs  can  be  used  to
inform  decisions   over   who   is   eligible   for   treatment,   support,   benefits   and
participation  in  research  studies  (Helzer  et  al.  [2006],  p.1673;  Hudziak  et  al.
[2007],  p.21).  Thirdly,  CPPDs  can  be  correlated  with  wider  factors  like  treatment
responses,  gender  ratios,  family  history  and  causal  factors  (Heinrichs,  [2015];  Sadler
[2005],  p.66).  Fourthly,  CPPDs  can  form  the  basis  of  a  cultural  and  political
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movement  (Orgota  [2013],  p.80).  However,  all  these  advantages  are  stronger  when
people  receiving  a  particular  CPPD  are  significantly  homogeneous  with  respect  to
symptoms.  As  I  now  show,  critics  question  the  merits  of  people  with  significantly
different  symptoms  receiving  the  same  CPPD.
Unlike  dimensional  diagnoses,  CPPDs  are  binary;  a  particular  individual
either   meets  the  diagnostic   criteria  or  does  not   meet   the  diagnostic  criteria.
Everyone  who  is  accurately  assessed  will  fall  into  one  of  two  camps:  either  they
qualify  for  a  particular  CPPD  or  they  do  not.  Under  a  categorical  system  no  one
only  partly  has  a  CPPD.  They  are  also  polythetic.  It  is  in  the  nature  of  polythetic
diagnostic  criteria  that  there  is  more  than  one  way  to  meet  the  diagnostic  criteria.
It  is  not  the  case  that  an  individual  need  exhibit  all  of  the  symptoms  on  the
diagnostic  checklist  to  receive  a  CPPD.  Rather,  they  only  need  exhibit  a  certain
number  of  symptoms.  Two  individuals  can  thus  receive  the  same  CPPD  despite  not
exhibiting  the  same  symptoms  (Sadler  [2005],  p.65;  Vanheule  [2017],  p.85).  CPPDs
by  default  cover  a  heterogeneous  symptom  profile.  Whilst  many  diagnoses  in  other
branches  of  medicine  can  also  cover  heterogeneous  symptoms,  critics  regard  the
heterogeneity  of  CPPDs  as  particularly  problematic.  In  some  cases,  individuals  who
receive  the  same  CPPD  seem  to  be  extremely  heterogeneous.  For  example,  there
are  approximately  one  hundred  and  twenty  six  ways  to  meet  the  diagnostic  criteria
for  Borderline  Personality  Disorder  (Lenzenweger  [2010],  p.196).  ASD  (the  CPPD  I
will  primarily  employ  as  an  example)  similarly  covers  individuals  who  exhibit
heterogeneous  symptom  profiles  (Timini  et  al.  [2011],  p.178).  Additionally,  most
CPPDs  appear  to  cover  individuals  with  significantly  greater  causal  heterogeneity
compared  to  diagnoses  in  most  other  branches  of  medicine  (Cuthbert  &  Insel
[2013],  p.3).
The  polythetic  nature  of  CPPDs  means  that  they  give  clues  as  to  what
symptoms  an  individual  might  have  but  do  not  reveal  what  symptoms  they  actually
do  have.  This  is  because  an  individual  usually  needs  exhibit  only  some,  rather  than
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all,  symptoms  listed  in  the  diagnostic  criteria  to  receive  a  CPPD.  Consequently,
knowing  an  individual  has  a  CPPD  only  reveals  that  they  have  some  symptoms
associated  with  their  CPPD  but  does  not  reveal  which  ones.  As  a  partial  exception
some  CPPDs  have  a  diagnostic  criteria  which  is  polythetic  but  still  require  some
specific  symptom  to  be  present  (such  as  the  symptom  of  depressed  mood  being
required  for  a  diagnosis  of  the  CPPD  DSM-5  depression).  However,  the  diagnostic
criteria  of  many  CPPDs  do  not  have  any  required  symptoms  and  those  that  do
typically  have  only  a  small  number  of  required  symptoms.  Simply  knowing  that
someone  has  a  CPPD  results  in  a  significant  lack  of  specificity  over  which
symptoms  an  individual  with  a  CPPD  actually  has.  Two  quotes  highlight  this
problem.  Kinderman  Read,  Moncrieff  and  Bentall  write  that:
two  people  with  a  diagnosis  of  ‘schizophrenia’  or  ‘personality  disorder’  may  possess  no
two  symptoms  in  common,  [so]  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  communicative  benefit  is  served
by  using  these  diagnoses.  Surely  a  description  of  a  person’s  real  problems  would  suffice?
A  description  of  an  individual’s  actual  problems  would  provide  more  information  and  be  of
greater  communicative  value  than  a  diagnostic  label  (Kinderman  et  al.  [2013],  p.3;  see  also
Johnstone  [2018],  p.39).
Similarly,  Vanheule  writes  that  ‘[in  categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnoses]
diversity  is  subsumed  under  a  general  nominator  and  as  a  result  the  more  specific
features   that   characterize  individual   cases   fade  into  an  abyss   of  irrelevance’
(Vanheule  [2017],  p.85).  In  relation  to  ASD,  a  child  psychiatrist  questions  if  ‘‘this
label  of  'ASD'  adds  anything  to  our  understanding’  (Latif  [2016],  p.290)  and  an
academic  and  mother  of  an  autistic  child  writes  that  she  ‘wonder[ed]  what  that
word  [autism]  adds  to  the  conversation’  (Runswick-Cole  [2016],  p.27;  see  also
Hassal  2016,  p.51;  Timini  et  al.  2011,  p.1).  These  critics  of  CPPDs  suggest  that
they  are  superfluous  because  they  lack  specificity  over  which  symptoms  are  present.
As  many  critics  point  out,  there  are  alternative  means  of  revealing  what
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symptoms  are  present  and  these  alternatives  avoid  the  lack  of  specificity.  At  the
most  basic  level,  upon  meeting  an  individual  with  a  CPPD  one  can  directly
establish  which  symptoms  they  have  through  directly  observing  them  or  talking  to
them  (if  they  cannot  talk  then  one  might  instead  talk  to  a  family  member,  a  friend
or  their  carer).  Similarly,  mental  health  workers  could  communicate  about  a  patient
or  client  not  through  discussing  their  CPPD  but  instead  through  discussing  their
symptoms.  As  Kinderman  writes,  ‘[a]n  alternative  to  psychiatric  diagnosis  would  be
simply  to  list  a  person's  experiences  in  their  [the  person's]  own  terms’  ([2019],
p.185).  Additionally,  a  specialist  technique  called  a  ‘formulation’  (otherwise  known
as   a   psychological   formulation,   psychosocial   formulation   or   a   clinical   case
formulation)   has   been   developed   to   assist   psychologists   and   psychiatrists   in
establishing  this  and  other  relevant  information.  A  formulation  is  the  
process  of  co-constructing  a  hypothesis  or  ‘best  guess’  about  the  origins  of  a  person’s
difficulties  in  the  context  of  their  relationships,  social  circumstances,  life  events,  and  the
sense  that  they  have  made  of  them…  Formulation  draws  on  two  equally  important  sources
of  evidence:  the  clinician  brings  knowledge  derived  from  theory,  research,  and  clinical
experience,  while  the  service  user  brings  expertise  about  their  own  life  and  the  meaning
and  impact  of  their  relationships  and  circumstances  (Johnstone  [2018],  p.32;  see  also
Vanheule  [2017],  p.172)
Each  formulation  is  tailored  to  the  specific  individual  (Aveline  [1999],  p.207;
Johnstone  [2018],  p.32;  Vanheule  [2017],  p.104).  A  formulation  will  aim  to  describe
the  specific  behaviours  an  individual  exhibits  and  describe  how  they  feel.  Unlike
CPPDs,  a  formulation  will  actually  describe  which  symptoms  an  individual  exhibits.
This  means  they  avoid  the  lack  of  specificity  of  CPPDs.  Additionally,  a  formulation
aims  to  give  an  account  of  why  an  individual  acts  in  unusual  ways  or  feels
distress.   A  formulation  places   emphasis   on  factors   that   are   particular   to   an
individual  such  as  life  history,  social  circumstances,  life  events  and  the  particular
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psychology  of  the  individual  (Johnstone  [2018],  p.33;  Vanheule  [2017],  p.172).  The
greater  level  of  precision  supplied  by  formulations  compared  to  CPPDs  is  also
useful  when  making  decisions  over  treatment,  making  decisions  over  therapy  or
conducting   research   studies.   Critics   of   ASD  as   a   label   (whether   discussing
formulations  or  not)   have  similarly  suggested  that   simply  focusing  upon  the
individual  person,  rather  than  giving  them  a  CPPD,  would  be  much  more  useful
(Hodge  [2016],  p.197;  Latif  [2016],  p.297;  Runswick  Cole  [2016],  p.27).  
Formulations  can  be  used  alongside  CPPDs  (Lingiardi  et  al.  [2015],  p.107).
The   DSM  and   the   ICD  recommend   using   formulations   alongside   categories
(although,  as  critics  bemoan,  the  DSM-5  only  has  two  paragraphs  discussing
formulations  (Vanheule  [2017],  p.153)).  Additionally,  a  diagnostic  manual  has  been
designed  to  help  provide  formulations  alongside  CPPDs  (Lingiardi  et  al.  [2015]).
Although  I  will  argue  for  the  importance  of  employing  CPPDs  I  will  also  show
that  CPPDs  alone  are  insufficient;  they  need  supplementing  with  formulations.
However,  many  advocates  of  formulations  argue  that  they  should  be  used  instead  of
rather  than  alongside  CPPDs.  This  is  because  CPPDs  are  seen  as  superfluous.
Johnstone  writes  that  
if  a  psychosocial  formulation  can  provide  a  reasonably  complete  explanation  for  the
experiences  that  have  led  to  a  psychiatric  diagnosis,  what  ever  they  may  be,  then  there  is
no  place  or  need  for  a  competing  hypothesis  that  says  ‘and  by  the  way,  it  is  also  because
she  has  schizophrenia.’  The  diagnosis  becomes  redundant  (Johnstone  [2018],  p.39).
Advocates  of  solely  using  formulations  argue  that  the  formulation  renders  the
CPPDs  superfluous,   obsolete   and   irrelevant.   If   a   formulation   describes   what
symptoms  someone  has  then  it  does  everything  that  the  CPPD  is  doing  (and  a  lot
more  besides)  making  it  unclear  what  the  CPPD  is  contributing  above  and  beyond
what  the  formulation  contributes  (Johnstone  [2018],  p.39;  Kinderman  et  al.  [2013],
p.3;  Vanheule  [2017],  p.85).  Critics  of  ASD  as  a  label  have  similarly  argued  that
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people  can  be  understood  independently  of  knowing  they  have  ASD  and  that  ASD
adds  nothing  to  understanding  them  (Latif  [2016],  p.290;  see  also  Hassal  [2016],
p.51;  Timini  et  al.  [2011],  p.1;  Runswick-Cole  [2016],  p.27).
I  have  now  identified  the  argument  which  I  respond  to.  Some  critics  see  all
possible,  all  currently  employed  or  particular  CPPDs  as  superfluous.  They  argue  we
should  dispense  with  the  CPPD  and  instead  directly  investigate  the  individual.  In
the  remainder  of  this  article  I  will  argue  that  some  CPPDs  are  not  superfluous
because  they  can  make  a  positive  contribution  to  understanding  which  symptoms  an
individual  exhibits,  and  how  they  exhibit  those  symptoms,  and  that  this  contribution
is  lacking  when  dispensing  with  the  CPPD  to  directly  investigate  the  individual.  I
highlight  this  by  focusing  upon  ASD  and  later  consider  if  my  argument  can  be
generalised  to  other  CPPDs.  
Before  I  do  so,  however,  a  note  regarding  the  scope  of  this  paper  is
required.  There  are  multiple  potential  concerns  with  the  CPPDs  listed  in  the  DSM
and  ICD  which  I  will  not  address  here.  Firstly,  virtually  no  DSM  and  ICD  CPPDs
have  established  causal  origins  and  are  only  very  weakly  correlated  with  any
particular   causal   factor   (Cuthbert   &  Insel   [2013],   p.3;   Poland  [2014],   p.34).
Secondly,   DSM  and  ICD  CPPDs  are  often  conceptualised  as  the  product  of
biological  abnormalities,  but  this  ignores  the  role  of  the  environment  in  either  being
the  cause  of  the  difficulties  or  in  exasperating  the  difficulties  (Johnstone  [2018],
p.33;  Kinderman  et  al.  [2013],  p.2).  Thirdly,  by  being  binary  (either  present  or
absent),  DSM  and  ICD  CPPDs  do  not  describe  the  degree  to  which  someone
meets,  or  fails  to  meet,  the  diagnostic  criteria  (Helzer  et  al.  [2006],  p.1673;
Hudziak  [2007],  p.21).  Fourthly,  critics  often  see  DSM  and  ICD  CPPDs  as  having
a  negative  impact  upon  the  self  perception  of  an  individual  with  a  CPPD  and  on
the  perception  of  others  towards  individuals  with  CPPDs  (Johnstone  [2014],  p.275;
Vanheule  [2017],  p.275).  Fifthly,  DSM  and  ICD  CPPDs  are  of  limited  use  for
selecting  treatment.  Most  drugs  and  therapies  are  not  effective  for  everyone  with  a
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particular  CPPD  (Cooper  [2007],  p.150).  Sixthly,  DSM  and  ICD  CPPDs  are  of
limited  use  as  a  basis  for  researching  causes  because  they  typically  group  together
causally  heterogeneous  individuals  (Cuthbert  &  Insel  [2009],  p.989;  Poland  [2014],
p.46).  In  this  paper  I  do  not  attempt  to  deal  with  such  concerns.  
In  the  next  section  I  outline  Giere's  philosophy  of  science,  which  I  will  then
use  in  developing  my  argument  that  CPPDs  play  a  useful  role.
3  Ronald  Giere's  Philosophy  Of  Science
Ronald  Giere  is  a  contemporary  philosopher  of  science  who  has  pioneered  a  model-
based  account  of  how  scientific  theories  relate  to  the  world.  In  this  section  I
outline  his  account  and  then  apply  it  to  psychiatry.  Giere's  account  involves  three
different  elements,  namely  physical  systems,  theories  and  models.  I  shall  outline
what  these  are  and  how  they  relate  to  one  another.  
A  physical  system  is  a  part  of  the  world  that  scientists  (or  indeed  anyone)
can  investigate.  A  physical  system  may  be  a  static  state  or  an  unfolding  process.  It
might  cover  a  single  entity  or  might  cover  interactions  between  multiple  entities.
Giere  gives  the  example  of  a  swinging  pendulum.  At  any  particular  moment  the
pendulum  is  at  a  particular  height,  is  travelling  at  a  particular  velocity,  and  is
taking  a  particular  straight  or  circular  path.  These  all  relate  to  aspects  of  the  world
at  a  particular  time.
A  scientist  who  wished  to  predict  height,  velocity  or  path  of  a  pendulum
would  have  a  number  of  tools  at  their  disposal.  Typically,  most  people  see  science
as  involving  theory  and  data.  On  this  understanding,  height,  velocity  and  path  relate
to  data  and  these  can  be  predicted  by  theory.  This  understanding  conceals  two
different  elements  which  Giere's  account  brings  out.  Most  people  likely  presume
that  scientists  would  employ  a  law  of  nature,  such  as  one  of  Newton's  laws,  to
make  these  predictions.  However,  as  Giere  argues,  theories  like  Newton's  laws  are
of  limited  application  for  such  purposes.  These  describe  relationships  between  a  few
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factors  but  do  not  describe  many  factors  relevant  to  the  actual  physical  system  such
as  wind  speed,  friction  and  shape.  As  a  consequence,  scientific  theories  such  as
Newton's  laws  do  not  directly  relate  to  the  world.  The  theory  does  not  describe  the
physical  system  in  any  concrete  sense.  Rather,  the  theory  describes  what  would
occur  in  a  physical  system  if  significant  aspects  of  the  actual  physical  system  were
not  present.
If  theories  are  too  abstract  to  account  for  physical  systems,  then  how  do
scientists  go  about  making  predictions?  This  is  where  the  third  aspect  of  Giere's
account  comes  in.  Giere  outlines  how  scientists  employ  less  abstract  models  which
accommodate  greater  levels  of  specific  detail  that  is  missing  from  theories.  Through
adding  specific  ‘conditions  and  additional  constraints’  to  Newton's  laws  of  motions
‘one  can  generate  families  of  representational  models  that  can  be  used  to  represent
things  in  the  world’  ([2010],  p.270).  He  writes  that,  
adding  the  condition  that  F  =  -kx  yields  a  general  model  for  a  simple  harmonic  oscillator,
where  x  is  the  displacement  from  an  equilibrium  position  [...]   This  model  could  be  applied,
for  example,  to  a  pendulum  with  a  small  amplitude,  a  mass  hanging  from  a  spring,  the
end  of  a  cantilevered  beam,  or  a  diatomic  molecule  (Giere  [2004],  p.745).  
Various  parameters  of  the  linear  harmonic  oscillator  can  be  made  more  specific  in
various  ways  depending  on  whether  it  is  applied  to  a  pendulum,  a  spring,  etc.
These  more  specific  models  cover  detail  which  is  missing  from  the  theory  and  is
relevant  to  the  physical  system.  Consequently,  they  are  better  at  portraying  the
physical  system  than  theories  are.  
Having  outlined  physical  systems,  models  and  theories,  as  employed  in
Giere's  account  I  now  outline  two  important  relationships  between  them.  Firstly,  one
might  wonder  what  the  point  of  employing  theories  is  given  that  models  are  much
more  relevant  to  actual  physical  systems.  Though  theories  do  not  directly  relate  to
physical  systems  Giere  believes  theories  have  an  important  role.  Giere  sees  theories
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as  general  principles  which  guide  the  building  of  more  specific  models.  He  writes
that  theories  ‘function  more  like  recipes  for  constructing  models’  ([1994],  p.293).
Elsewhere  he  calls  them  ‘general  templates’  ([2004],  p.74).  He  describes  how  very
abstract  theories  provide  a  set  of  general  principles  to  which  scientists  can  add
more  specific  detail  when  creating  models.  Though  theories  are  far  removed  from
physical  systems  this  guidance  aspect  means  theories  are  not  superfluous.  
Secondly,  models  have  greater  resemblance  to  physical  systems  than  theories
do  but  they  also  do  not  fully  resemble  physical  systems.   Giere  outlines  how
models  do  not  convey  all  the  specific  details  of  an  actual  physical  system.  Some
models  have  a  high  level  of  generality  to  them  because  they  are  intended  to  cover
quite  a  lot  of  different  things.  A  linear  harmonic  oscillator  contains  more  specific
detail  than  is  present  in  Newton's  laws  of  motion  but  a  linear  harmonic  oscillator
can  be  applied  to  multiple  things  such  as  pendulums,  springs  and  cantilevered
beams.  Additionally,  employing  a  model  of  one  of  those  things,  rather  than  the
linear  harmonic  oscillator,  does  not  specify  the  length  of  a  specific  spring  or  the
specific  quantity  of  mass.  Finally,  if  a  specific  mass  and  spring  were  specified  a
model  would  still  only  be  accurate  to  a  certain  degree  rather  than  fully  resembling
an  actual  physical  system.  Experiments  have  a  margin  of  error  because  it  is
typically  impossible  to  fully  shield  off  all  interfering  causal  factors  whilst  there  is
always  the  possibility  that  there  are  unknown  causal  factors  present  (Giere  [2010],
p.273).  Consequently,   rather  than  seeing  models  as  fully  representing  physical
systems  they  should  instead  be  seen  as  having  degrees  of  similarity  to  physical
systems.  
I  suggest  that  Giere's  account  can  be  applied  to  psychiatry.  Firstly,  individual
people  should  be  thought  of  as  physical  systems.  They  are  a  part  of  the  world
which  has  specific  differences  to  any  other  part  of  the  world.  At  any  particular
time  they  can  be  acting,  perceiving,  thinking  and  feeling  in  a  certain  way.   People
are  parts  of  the  world  which  mental  health  professionals  (or  anyone)  may  be
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interested  in  describing  and  understanding.  People  are  not  simply  their  disorder  or
their   CPPD.  People  have  many  different  attributes  such  as  personalities,  past
histories,  social  situations  and  life  goals,  whereas  a  disorder  (say,  an  underlying
biological  mechanism)  or  a  CPPD  at  most  only  covers  some  of  those  attributes. 3
Secondly,  CPPDs  should  be  seen  as  very  general  models  which  have  high  levels  of
abstraction.  They  are  somewhat  analogous  to  Giere’s  account  of  theories  since  they
are  abstract  models  which  do  not  directly  relate  to  the  world  since  they  do  not
specify  which  specific  symptom  a  particular  individual  exhibits.4  On  Giere’s  account
the  distinction  between  theories  and  models  is  one  of  degree  rather  than  one  of
kind.  Theories  stereotypically  have  high  levels  of  abstraction  whereas  models
stereotypically  have  lower  levels  of  abstraction  but  Giere  otherwise  places  no  firm
boundaries  between  theories  and  models  (see  [2006],  p.67).  Since  CPPDs  are  not
stereotypically  described  as  ‘theories’  I  will  simply  describe  them  as  models.
Thirdly,  CPPDs  need  be  modelled  onto  specific  individuals  to  attain  specificity  over
which  symptoms  are  present.  In  contrast  to  situations  where  it  is  only  known
which  CPPD  someone  has,  a  CPPD  can  be  modelled  onto  a  specific  individual  by
specifying  which  symptoms  of  the  CPPD  are  present.  When  considered  through  this
model  the  individual  is  no  longer  thought  of  as  a  general  autistic  person  who  may
have  a  range  of  symptoms  but  instead  as  a  specific  autistic  person  with  specific
symptoms.  In  the  same  way  that  Giere  thinks  models  do  not  fully  describe  physical
systems  this  model  will  also  not  fully  describe  the  specific  individual  as  it  only
covers  some  of  their  characteristics.  A  description  of  the  specific  symptoms  they
3 Non-physicalists  might  dislike  describing  thoughts  and  feelings  as  physical.  Providing  it  is  
believed  that  thoughts  and  feelings  are  amenable  to  description  and  understanding  then  
substituting  'physical  system'  with  'mental  system'  would  work  equally  well  on  Giere’s  account.
4 CPPDs  are  not  fully  analogous  to  theories  because  Giere’s  put  theories  at  a  top  of  a  hierarchy  
of  models.  In  contrast,  CPPD  might  not  be  put  at  the  top  of  hierarchy  in  psychiatry.  Perhaps  
theorising  about  causality,  or  theorising  about  causality  of  a  particular  CPPD,  might  be  
considered  higher  in  the  hierarchy.  Such  theorising  might  be  even  more  abstract  and  distanced  
from  the  world  than  are  CPPDs.  Rather  than  try  and  establish  exactly  where  CPPDs  lie  in  a  
hierarchy  of  models,  it  suffices  for  my  argument  here  that  CPPDs  are  understood  as  being  very  
abstract  models  which  can  provide  guidance  towards  building  less  abstract  models
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have  will  not  reveal  aspects  which  are  not  symptoms  such  as  life  goals  or  socio-
economic  status,  as  well  as  aspects  which  are  not  psychiatrically  relevant  like  shoe
size  or  hair  colour.  The  assigned  symptoms  will  themselves  also  be  models  because
they  give  a  description  of  possible  behaviour  which  is  more  abstract  than  actual
behaviour  (in  that  the  symptom  of  low  social  skills  can  be  manifested  in  many
different  ways  in  real  world  behaviour.  I  return  to  this  point  in  section  4.3).  
Giere’s  account  emphasises  the  abstract  and  hierarchical  nature  of  science.
Scientific  models  vary  in  their  degree  of  abstraction.  This  variance  in  abstraction
may  relate  to  a  hierarchy  of  models.  A  less  abstract  model  may  be  an  applied
version,  with  more  real  world  details,  of  a  more  abstract  model.  CPPDs  similarly
exhibit  these  attributes  of  abstractness  and  hierarchy.  By  itself  a  CPPD  is  very
abstract  since  it  does  not  specify  which  symptoms  an  individual  exhibits.  However,
as  I  have  described,  it  can  be  modelled  onto  a  specific  individual  to  specify  which
symptoms  are  present.  This  more  detailed  model  will  provide  more  details  but  will
not  describe  all  aspects  of  the  individual.  Thus,  like  on  Giere’s  account,  there  are
more  abstract  CPPDs  which  lack  real  world  detail  and  then,  in  a  hierarchical
relationship,  a  less  abstract  model  consisting  of  the  CPPD  and  a  specification  of  an
individual’s  specific  symptoms.  This  more  detailed  model  contains  more  real  world
details  but  still  does  not  fully  describe  the  person.  Giere  sees  theories  as  being
principles  for  constructing  less  abstract  models.  In  what  follows  I  will  argue  that
CPPDs  can  be  used  to  assist  creating  less  abstract  models  which  do  specify  which
symptoms  are  present.  This  will  show  that  CPPDs  are  not  superfluous.
Giere  sees  his  position  (in  his  wider  work  on  scientific  perspectivism
([2006],  p.3))  as  falling  between  traditional  scientific  realism  and  anti-realism.
Theories   do   not   directly   relate   to   the   world   whereas   models   have   greater
resemblance  to  the  world  but  do  not  fully  account  for  all  aspects  of  physical
systems.  Rather  than  a  hard  scientific  realist  account  whereby  a  theory  corresponds
with  the  world,  Giere  employs  a  minimal,  non-metaphysical  account  of  scientific
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realism  whereby  there  are  degrees  of  similarity  between  a  theory  or  model  and  an
aspect  of  the  world  ([2006],  p.66).  This  minimal  notion  of  realism  is,  I  believe,  the
strongest  possible  realist  account  of  CPPDs.  They  do  not  accurately  describe  actual
people.  They,  do,  however  have  degrees  of  resemblance  to  actual  people  but  will
not  cover  every  aspect  of  the  individual.  In  this  regard  there  is  a  level  of
similarity  between  the  CPPD  and  the  actual  person  and  then  a  higher  level  of
similarity  between  a  CPPD  which  has  been  modelled  to  that  person  (and  thereby
specifies  which  symptoms  are  present)  and  that  actual  person.  On  Giere’s  account
abstractness  is  not  a  barrier  to  a  minimal  understanding  of  scientific  realism  and
so,  on  this  approach,  a  type  of  realism,  albeit  a  very  minimal  type,  is  potentially
applicable  to  CPPDs.  Their  abstract  nature  alone  is  not  grounds  for  considering
them  as  mere  constructs  or  labels.
Philosopher  of  psychiatry  Dominic  Murphy  has  also  related  Giere's  approach
to  psychiatric  diagnoses  in  outlining  his  view  that  psychiatric  diagnoses  can  be
understood  as  exemplars.  He  describes  exemplars  as  ‘a  representation  of  the  clinical
features  and  typical  course  of  a  disorder,  abstracted  away  from  the  detail  of
individual  variation’  ([2006],  p.202).  These  are  abstract  since  Murphy  believes  that
‘it  is  possible  that  no  actual  patients  embody  all  the  features  of  an  exemplar,
although  patients  who  share  a  diagnosis  embody  at  least  some  features  of  the
exemplar’  ([2016],  pp.202—3).  Like  me,  Murphy  outlines  how  psychiatry  has
multiple  models  which  have  varying  levels  of  abstraction.  My  focus  here,  however,
differs  from  Murphy's.  He  is  primarily  interested  in  the  abstract  nature  of  exemplars
and  their  relationship  to  causes.  He  does  not  discuss  how  psychiatric  diagnoses  can
be  used  to  guide  detecting  and  understanding  symptoms.  I  employ  a  model-based
view  of  CPPDs  to  show  that  there  are  advantages  to  employing  CPPDs.  I  will  now
show  how  CPPDs   can   contribute   to   accurately   detecting   and   understanding
symptoms.
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4  Psychiatric  Diagnoses  Are  Not  Superfluous
4.1  Advantage  one:  Categorical  psychiatric  polythetic  diagnoses  can  assist
accurately  detecting  symptoms
Symptoms  can  be  difficult  to  accurately  detect  for  a  number  of  reasons.  I  shall
show  why  this  is  and  then  show  how  CPPDs  can  make  detecting   symptoms  easier
by  providing  helpful  guidance.  
First,  and  most  obviously,  some  symptoms  are  intrinsically  hard  to  observe,
or   are   completely   unobservable   by  third-parties.  For   example,   the   repetitive
behaviour  associated  with  ASD  is  typically  comparatively  easy  to  observe  compared
to  the  repetitive  thoughts  since  these  latter  symptoms  are  not  typically  observable  to
third-parties.  Behaviour  varies  in  how  observable  it  is,  but  some  behaviour  has
significant  distance  from  perception.
Second,  some  symptoms  are  in  principle  observable  but  are  hard  to  notice
because  they  lack  saliency  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  Many  symptoms  do  not  differ
from  typical  behaviour  qualitatively  but  only  to  a  matter  of  degree.  For  example,
ASD  is  associated  with  low  eye  contact  but  people  with  ASD  typically  still  look
others  in  the  eyes  sometimes,  just  to  a  lesser  extent  than  do  typical  people.  A
behaviour  which  is  rarely  presented  rather  than  absent  is  less  likely  to  stand  out  as
unusual.  Sometimes  an  individual  may  have  a  propensity  to  exhibit  a  particular
behaviour  but  the  propensity  is  hidden  because  they  consciously  or  unconsciously
mask  it  (Hull  et  al.  [2017],  p.2525;  Livingston  &  Happé  [2017],  p.732).  For
example,  an  autistic  individual  might  draw  upon  past  experience  to  establish  which
sorts  of  comments  are  considered  acceptable.  They  may  attempt  to  pass  as  'normal'
in  social  situations  by  sticking  to  acceptable  comments  but  this  does  not  actually
mean  they  now  have  typical   social   understanding.   Symptoms  can  also  pass
unnoticed  in  cases  where  an  individual  has  become  used  to  behaving  as  they  do.
When  a  symptom  becomes  second  nature,  the  affected  individual,  and  those  around
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them,  might  not  realise  it  is  abnormal.  Some  symptoms  are  only  displayed  in
particular  situations.   For  example,   an  individual  with  low  social   skills  might
socialise  at  normal  levels  around  their  family.  The  low  social  skills  might  not  be
noticed  or  not  considered  representative.  
Third,  even  when  a  symptom  is  noticed  it  can  be  unclear  how  it  should
best  be  described.  For  example,  imagine  an  individual  who  is  considered  to  exhibit
symptoms  of  anxiety.  Now  imagine  further  causal  investigation  established  that  the
anxiety  primarily  occurs  because  the  individual  struggles  to  adapt  to  changes  at
work.  The  individual  prefers  to  know  in  advance  what  is  expected  of  them  and
becomes  anxious  when  required  to  do  unexpected  tasks  or  if  required  to  go  about
doing  expected  tasks  in  unexpected  ways.  Describing  this  individual  as  suffering
from  the  symptom  anxiety  is  not  wholly  inaccurate,  but  an  alternative  symptom  can
be  assigned  which  accommodates  some  of  this  causal  information.  People  with  ASD
often  struggle  with  unexpected  changes.  This  is  a  subtle  symptom  where  the  mind
keeps  going  in  the  direction  of  what  was  expected  and  inflexibly  comes  up  against,
or  struggles  to  accommodate  to,  what  is  unexpected.  Describing  the  individual  as
suffering  from  the  symptom  of  ‘disliking  change’  better  describes  their  issues  than
does  the  description  ‘anxiety’.
I  suggest  that  CPPDs  can  provide  guidance  which  can  help  mental  health
professionals  to  accurately  detect  and  describe  symptoms.  Understood  in  Giere's
framework,  a  CPPD  is  not  in  itself  a  particularly  good  model  for  any  particular
individual.  Without  further  modelling  a  CPPD  fails  to  accurately  describe  people,  in
an  analogous  way  to  how  theories  in  the  physical  sciences  fail  to  reflect  actual
physical  systems.  However,  CPPDs  can  guide  building  less  abstract  models  of
people  that  can  specify  which  symptoms  are  present,  in  an  analogous  manner  to
how  theories  in  the  physical  sciences  can  guide  building  models  which  greater
resemble  the  real  world.
  CPPDs  are  constructed  from  studying  (in  clinical  or  experimental  settings)  a
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large  number  of  people.  This  process  eventually  results  in  producing  a  diagnostic
checklist  which  consists  of  various  symptoms.  The  main  reason  why  any  particular
symptom  is  placed  upon  the  checklist  is  that  clinical  or  experimental  evidence
suggests  it  occurs  together  with  other  symptoms  with  a  degree  of  frequency.
Imagine  a  particular  symptom  more  frequently  occurs  together  with  a  second
symptom  than  it  does  with  a  third.  In  principle,  the  first  and  second  symptoms  are
more  likely  to  be  present  on  the  diagnostic  checklist  than  are  the  first  and  the
third.  More  realistically,  the  presence  of  multiple  occurring  symptoms  together  with
significant  frequency  is  required  for  them  to  be  included  within  a  diagnostic
criteria.  Correlations  established  from  clinical  or  experimental  settings  are  parsed  up
through  clinical  wisdom  or  formal  methods  like  factor  analysis  into  a  set  of
diagnostic  criteria  (arguably,  this  process  will  be  driven  by  further  explicit  or
implicit  theoretical  assumptions  (Cooper  [2007],  p.51;  Murphy  [2006],  p.226)  and
this  process  could  result  in  many  different  possible  sets  of  CPPDs,  containing
different  CPPDs,  rather  than  simply  entailing  one  set  of  CPPDs  (Kendler  et  al.
[2011],  p.1149;  Kincaid  [2014],  p.151)).5  This  means  that  the  diagnostic  criteria  of
a  CPPD  is  built  from  studies  of  particular  individuals.  The  CPPD  delineates  an
abstract  picture  of  what  those  individuals  look  like  which  can  then  be  used  to  give
an  indication  of  what  someone  else  who  meets  the  diagnostic  criteria  for  that
CPPD  looks  like.
To  take  an  example  of  how  a  CPPD  can  guide  detecting  symptoms,  imagine
that  an  individual  who  has  not  been  given  a  CPPD  meets  a  psychiatrist  for  the
first  time  and,  during  the  assessment,  the  psychiatrist  notices  the  sole  symptom  of
low  social  skills.  The  psychiatrist  could  establish  which  CPPDs  have  diagnostic
criteria   which   include   this   symptom.   Since   CPPDs   describe   correlations   of
5 There  are  multiple  possible  reasons  why  symptoms  correlate  together.  They  may  be  one,  or  
multiple,  underlying  causes,  there  may  be  both  internal  and  external  causes  and  also  the  
symptoms  may  be  in  a  causal  relationship  with  one  another  whereby  one  symptom  produces  
another  symptom.  For  my  account  here  it  does  not  matter  exactly  why  symptoms  correlate  
together.  The  mere  fact  that  symptoms  do  tend  to  correlate  suffices  for  CPPDs  to  facilitate  
symptom-detection.
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symptoms  the  psychiatrist   could  proceed  to   investigate  for  all   the  symptoms
associated  with  all   those  CPPDs.  Of  course,   low  social   skills   occur   in  the
diagnostic  criteria  of  many  different  CPPDs,  so  here  the  guidance  aspect  is  not
particularly   strong.  It   becomes   much   stronger   when   multiple   symptoms   are
considered.  Low  social  skills  are  correlated  with  many  symptoms,  whereas  the
simultaneous  presence  of  low  social  skills  and  low  eye  contact  is  correlated  with
fewer.  Even  fewer  CPPDs  are  covered  by  the  simultaneous  presence  of  low  social
skills,  low  eye  contact  and  repetitive  behaviours.  Whilst  not  present  in  most  CPPDs
these  symptoms  do  occur  together  in  the  diagnostic  criteria  for  ASD.  Keeping  the
diagnostic  criteria  for  ASD  in  mind  can  help  guide  observation  towards  other
symptoms  an  individual  may  exhibit,  including  difficult  to  spot  symptoms.  For
example,  upon  establishing  an  individual  displays  repetitive  behaviour  there  is
reason  to  investigate  whether  they  also  have  repetitive  thoughts.  Similarly,  upon
anxiety  being  noticed  as  present  there  is  reason  to  investigate  whether  it  occurs
following  unexpected  changes.  This  guidance  aspect  can  also  be  used  outside  of
psychiatric  evaluations  to  assist  others  in  noticing  symptoms,  such  as  other  mental
health  workers,  the  individual  with  the  CPPD,  their  family  and  co-workers.
Analysing  the  diagnostic  criteria  for  ASD  can  help  elucidate  this  process.
The  diagnostic  criteria  for  ASD  has  multiple  aspects.  Firstly,  there  are  two  broad
categories:  Category  A  covering  ‘Persistent  deficits  in  social  communication  and
social  interaction  across  multiple  contexts’  ([2013],  p.50)  and  category  B  covering
‘Restricted,  repetitive  patterns  of  behavior,  interests,  or  activities’  ([2013],  p.50).  The
diagnostic  criteria  can  provide  guidance  at  this  very  broad  level.  Imagine  that  a
psychiatrist  detects  multiple  symptoms  from  Category  A  within  a  patient  during  an
assessment.  Upon  consulting  or  remembering  the  DSM  it  should  be  clear  that  the
individual  partially  fits  the  diagnostic  criteria  for  ASD.  This  then  gives  reason  to
investigate  for  symptoms  of  Category  B  of  ASD.  Note  that  there  seems  no  obvious
initial  relationship  between  Category  A  and  Category  B.  It  does  not  seem  to  be  the
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case  that  Category  A  symptoms  cause  Category  B  symptoms,  or  that  Category  B
symptoms  are  rarer  minor  variations  on  Category  A  symptoms.  The  diagnostic
criteria  of  the  CPPD  provides  reason  to  look  for  otherwise  seemingly  completely
unrelated  symptoms.
The  diagnostic  criteria  of  the  CPPD  can  also  provide  guidance  in  assigning
more  precise  symptoms.  Category  A  consists  of  three  further  sub-categories:  1.
‘Deficits  in  social-emotional  reciprocity  [...]  2  Deficits  in  non-verbal  communicative
behaviors  used  for  social  interaction  [...]  3.  Deficits  in  developing,  maintaining,  and
understanding  relationships’  ([2013],  p.50).  These  sub-categories  are  a  more  nuanced
understanding  of  behaviour.  For  example,  rather  than  simply  listing  a  broad  notion
of  low  social   understanding  these  sub-categories  guide  awareness  towards  the
distinction  between  verbal  and  non-verbal  aspects  to  interpersonal  communication  as
well  as  the  distinction  between  social-emotional  reciprocity  and  understanding  of
social  relationships.  Finally,  each  of  the  seven  sub-categories  (including  the  four
from  Category  B)  are   highlighted  by  more  detailed  examples.   For   example,
deficient  social-emotional  reciprocity  range  ‘from  abnormal  social  approach  and
failure  of  normal  back-and-forth  conversation;  to  reduced  sharing  of  interests,
emotions,  or  affect;  to  failure  to  initiate  or  respond  to  social  interactions’  ([2013],
p.50).  All  of  these  are  again  more  nuanced  and  more  subtle  ways  to  describing
autistic  social  skills.  Upon  the  detection  of  some  symptoms  associated  with  ASD
the  diagnostic   criteria  gives   reason  to  investigate   for  more  precisely  defined
symptoms.  
My  claim  fits  well  with  the  experience  of  people  who  have  ASD.  They
often  feel  that  they  have  a  greater  understanding  of  who  they  are  after  receiving  a
CPPD  of  ASD.  For  example,  an  autistic  person  who  interviewed  multiple  autistic
people  writes  that  ‘[m]any  felt  that  this  [being  diagnosed]  led  to  a  greater  sense  of
self-understanding’  (Milton  &  Sims  [2017],  p.152).  I  suggest  that  this  is  partly
because  the  CPPD  can  help  them  notice  and  understand  how  they  are  acting  (see
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Hacking  ([1999])  and  Orgota  ([2013])  for  additional  reasons  why  a  psychiatric
diagnosis  can  change  self-understanding).
It  could  be  argued  that  well-trained  experienced  clinicians  do  not  need  the
guidance  supplied  by  the  diagnostic  criteria  of  CPPDs.  They  might  be  able  to  draw
upon  other  resources  to  achieve  similar  effect.  It  is  true  that  some  symptoms  will
be  easier  to  spot  than  others,  and  that  some  clinicians  will  have  significantly  more
training  and  experience  than  others.  In  some  context  the  guidance  supplied  by  the
diagnostic  criteria  of  CPPDs  may  not  strictly  speaking  be  needed  (though  this
would  not  necessarily  show  that  diagnostic  criteria  are  worthless  as  using  them
might  still  save  time).  However,  it  is  worth  remembering  that  many  psychiatric
symptoms  are  subtle.  Also,  many  clinicians  are  not  experts.  A  great  deal  of  care  is
provided  by  GPs.  The  training  of  mental  health  professionals  is  also  mixed.  A  2014
report  gives  statistics  for  mental  health  professionals  within  the  UK.  Consultant
psychiatrists  made  up  4.5%  of  the  mental  health  workforce,  clinical  psychology
staff  7.7%,  and  community  psychiatric  nurses  48.3%  (NHS  Factsheet  [2016]).
Finally,  a  recent  study  shows  that  clinicians  do  often  explicitly  consider  DSM
diagnostic  criteria  in  clinical  settings.  First  et  al.  ([2019])  write  that  ‘a  majority  of
clinicians  review  the  DSM  criteria  either  from  memory  or  in  written  form  to
determine  whether  diagnostic  criteria  are  met  during  the  initial  assessment’  (p.160).
Many  clinicians  do  keep  DSM  diagnostic  criteria  in  mind  when  assessing  patients
and  I  suggest  there  are  benefits  to  doing  so.  
4.2  Advantage  two:  Categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnoses  can  assist  with
detecting  changing  symptoms
The  symptoms  an  individual  exhibits  can  change  over  time  (Cuthbert  &  Insel
[2013],  p.5;  in  relation  to  ASD  see  Walsh  et  al.  [2011],  p.606).  Symptoms  may
start  being  exhibited,  may  stop  being  exhibited  and  may  change  how  or  when  they
are  exhibited.  In  this  section  I  will  outline  why  this  is  and  then  outline  how
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CPPDs  can  guide  awareness  towards  the  possibility  that  changes  can  occur  and
assist  establishing  which  changes  have  occurred.  
Whether  an  individual  manifests  a  symptom  and  how  it  manifests  can
depend  upon  external  and  internal  causes.  Different  symptoms  will  commonly  be
displayed  in  different  environments.  An  individual  may  have  a  propensity  to  exhibit
a  symptom  but  will  only  manifest  it  in  a  certain  environment,  and  the  same
symptom  may  manifest   differently  in  different  environments.  As  such,  if   the
environment  changes  then  so  too  which  symptoms  are  exhibited.  Additionally,  an
individual's   personality   and   past   experience   can   influence   whether   and   how
symptoms   manifest.  Most   people   will   undergo   changes   to   their   personality
throughout  the  course  of  their  life.  Individuals  constantly  gain  new  experiences  and
may  change  their  views  about  their  past  experiences.  Finally,  whether  and  how
symptoms  manifest  can  be  influenced  by  the  stance  the  individual  takes  towards
their  symptoms.  An  individual  might  gain  greater  awareness  of  why  a  symptom
occurs  or  which  behaviours  are  manifestations  of  the  symptom.  They  may  alter
whether  they  see  the  symptom  as  positive  or  negative.  They  may  actively  try  and
stop  the  symptom  occurring  or  change  how  it  occurs.  
Given  the  significant  possibility  that  the  symptoms  an  individual  manifests
will  change  over  time  it  is  helpful  to  associate  an  individual  with  a  wider  range  of
symptoms  than  those  they  exhibit  at  any  particular  time.  Rather  than  simply
modelling  the  symptoms  an  individual  has  it  is  thus  helpful  to  consider  them  an
instance  of  a  wider  CPPD  which  is  associated  with  a  wider  range  of  symptoms
than  any  particular  individual  exhibits.  In  an  analogous  way  to  Giere’s  notion  of  a
theory,  a  CPPD  can  act  as  a  template  or  recipe  which  entails  multiple,  more
specific  models.  Consequently,  a  CPPD  does  not  tie  the  individual  to  one  specific
model,  which  entails  one  specific  set  of  symptoms,  but  rather  suggests  a  range  of
models  may  be  possible  which  cover  various  sets  of  symptoms.  Since  there  is  more
than  one  way  to  be,  say,  autistic,  it  is  implicitly  suggested  that  symptoms  may
23
change,  and  so  raises  awareness  that  change  is  a  possibility.  More  importantly,  a
CPPD  can  guide  awareness  toward  detecting  which  new  symptoms  are  being
exhibited.  By  being  polythetic  a  CPPD  associates  an  individual  with  symptoms  they
are  not  currently  exhibiting  but  might  exhibit  in  the  future.  This  guides  awareness
towards  a  range  of  symptoms  that  are  more  likely  to  start  being  exhibited  by
people  with  that  CPPD.  This  is  helpful  given  the  hundreds  of  possible  symptoms
which  could  be  exhibited.  Additional  guidance  is  provided  if  a  CPPD  is  associated
with  a  developmental  course,  a  periodic  course  or  a  deteriorating  course,  such  as  is
respectively  associated  with  ASD,  bipolar  disorder,  and  schizophrenia.  This  may
allow  some  level  of  predictability  as  to  which  symptoms  will  start  occurring  and
which  will  stop  occurring.  None  of  this  guidance  is  given  when  simply  considering
which  symptoms  are  exhibited  at  a  particular  time.  
The  way  that  CPPDs  provide  guidance  over  detecting  changing  symptoms  is
also  relevant  for  difficult  to  spot  symptoms.  Imagine  an  individual  exhibited  a
subtle  symptom  and  a  psychiatrist  employed  their  specialist  training  to  detect  it.
Now  imagine  an  individual  only  starts  exhibiting  the  symptom  after  assessments  by
psychiatric  services  and  that  they  are  no  longer  seeing  psychiatric  professionals.  The
specialist  knowledge  supplied  by  the  psychiatrist  would  no  longer  be  present
whereas  the  guidance  provided  by  a  CPPD  would  still  be  present.  This  would  assist
with  symptom  attribution  over  difficult  to  spot  symptoms.  
4.3  Advantage  three:  Categorical  polythetic  psychiatric  diagnoses  can  associate
symptoms  with  more  specific  behaviour
A  CPPD  can  guide  building  more  specific  models  of  how  symptoms  manifest.
Many  symptoms  are  relatively  general  descriptions  that  cover  somewhat  diverse
behaviours  (Fellowes  [2017],  p.285).  Giere  argues  that  models  are  not  the  same  as
physical  systems,  rather  models  can  only  have  degrees  of  resemblance  to  physical
systems.  Similarly,  symptoms  are  not  the  same  as  actual  instances  of  behaviour,
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rather,  they  can  at  best  have  high  degrees  of  resemblance.   For  example,  the
symptom  ‘low  social   skills’  can  manifest   in   significantly  different   ways   for
significantly  different  reasons.  Four  examples  highlight  this.  One  individual  might
wish  to  socialise  in  what  are  typically  considered  to  be  normal  ways  but  has  a
significant  lack  of  social  understanding.  They  misjudge  social  boundaries  and  they
say  things  which  are  considered  unacceptable.  They  have  an  inbuilt  lack  of  intuitive
understanding  (one  which  they  may  be  able  to  improve  through  practice  or  support
but  only  to  a  limited  degree).  A  second  individual  might  exhibit  low  social  skills
because  they  are  very  withdrawn.  Their  subjective  lifeworld  (the  way  in  which
things  appear  meaningful  to  them)  is  so  different  to  most  people  that  they  do  not
wish  to  engage  on  a  social  level.  They  instead  withdraw  into  their  own  world.  A
third  individual  might  in  principle  be  able  to  socialise  in  a  normal  way.  However,
they  generally  have  no  desire  to  follow  social  conventions  except  when  they  are
able  to  manipulate  them  to  their  own  advantages.  They  have  no  desire  for  close
relationships  and  may  see  themselves  as  above  petty  social  conventions.   A  fourth
individual  might  be  capable  of  exhibiting  normal  levels  of  social  skills  providing
they  can  remain  sufficiently  calm  in  social  situations.  However,  the  individual
suffers  from  significant  levels  of  anxiety  in  social  situations.  The  panic  which
accompanies  most  social  situations  makes  it  difficult  for  them  to  function  socially
and  this  may  cause  them  to  act  in  ways  deemed  socially  inappropriate.  All  these
four  individuals  would  be  considered  to  exhibit  ‘low  social  skills’  despite  their
differences  in  behaviour  and  different  reasons  for  exhibiting  that  behaviour.  This
shows  that  symptoms  are  missing  some  of  the  specific  detail  present  in  instances  of
behaviour.  Knowing  that  an  individual  has  a  specific  symptom  indicates  a  range  of
possible  behaviours  rather  than  specifies  which  behaviour  is  present.  
CPPDs  can  guide  building  more  specific  models  of  symptoms  which  indicate
a  narrower  range  of  behaviour.  By  itself  a  symptom  can  be  associated  with
multiple  ways  of  manifesting  but  when  considered  as  part  of  a  CPPD  there  may  be
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an  indication  that  some  manifestations  of  the  symptom  are  more  likely  than  others.
For  example,  each  manifestation  of  low  social  skills  I  outlined  above  is  associated
with  a  particular  CPPD.  ASD  is  most  associated  with  the  ingrained  lack  of  social
understanding,  schizophrenia  with  withdrawal,  personality  disorders  with  indifference,
and  social  anxiety  with  anxiety.  In  all  these  cases  a  CPPD  can  guide  building  more
specific  models  of  how  a  particular  symptom  manifests.  These  more  specific  models
mean  that  the  symptom  now  gives  a  greater  indication  of  which  behaviour  is  likely
to  occur.  The  symptoms  indicate  which  manifestation  is  most  likely  but  helpfully
does  not  disassociate  the  individual  from  less  likely  manifestations.  Though  low
social  skills  in  autism  is  most  associated  with  ingrained  lack  of  social  skills  an
autistic   individual   may  be   withdrawn,   may  see   themselves   as   above  social
convention  and  may  face  anxiety  in  social  situations.  The  symptom  allows  an
individual  to  be  understood  in  diverse  ways  but  by  situating  the  symptom  within  a
CPPD  guidance  is  given  over  which  way  or  ways  is  more  likely.  Knowing  an
individual  both  exhibits  a  symptom  and  has  a  CPPD  may  reveal  more  information
about  the  behaviour  associated  with  the  symptom  compared  to  simply  knowing  they
exhibit  the  symptom.  
The  guidance  supplied  by  CPPDs  is  lacking  if  clinicians  dispense  with
CPPDs  and  just  directly  describe  the  individual.  To  make  up  for  this  deficit
attempts  to  directly  describe  the  individual  would  need  a  more  nuanced  set  of
symptoms  than  are  currently  employed.  Plausibly,  there  are  many  advantages  to
formulating  new,  more  nuanced  symptoms  which  would  each  cover  a  more  specific
set  of  behaviours.  Advocates  of  formulations  sometimes  argue  currently  employed
symptoms  are  often  conceptualised  in  too  broad  a  manner  and  that  more  specific
descriptions  would  usually  be  more  helpful  (Vanheule  [2017],  p.100).  Doing  this
would  go  some  way  to  make  directly  describing  the  individual  work.  However,
there  would  be  many  disadvantages  to  formulating  these  more  nuanced  symptoms.
First,  this  would  require  many  more  symptoms  to  be  formulated.  Psychiatrists
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would  need  to  give  a  much  larger  number  of  symptoms  fair  consideration  when
diagnosing  symptoms  meanwhile  other  mental  health  workers  and  the  general  public
would  need  awareness  of  a  much  greater  range  of  symptoms.  Second,  even  if  there
was  awareness  of  all  these  more  specific  symptoms  there  would  also  have  to  be
awareness  of  how  they  differ  from  one  another.  In  a  system  of  more  nuanced
symptoms  it  will  be  more  common  that  two  different  symptoms  cover  overlapping
behaviour   and  that   some  symptoms  will   be  more  specific   versions  of  other
symptoms.  This  can  be  expected  to  cause  problems  regarding  the  reliability  of
symptom  attribution  (whether  different  psychiatrists  attribute  different  symptoms  to
the  same  individual)  and  will  cause  non-mental  health  professionals  significant
difficulties   at   understanding  which   symptoms  cover   which   behaviour.  Thirdly,
assigning  symptoms  which  are  tied  to  very  specific  behaviour  seems  less  conducive
to  the  notion  that  an  individual  might  change  their  behaviour  across  time.  In
contrast,  formulating  symptoms  with  a  higher  degree  of  generality  means  they  can
be  associated  with  a  greater  range  of  behaviour  and  which  are  exhibited  may  be
influenced  by  changing  factors  which  are  internal  or  external  to  the  individual.
There  are  many  possible  degrees  of  generality  at  which  symptoms  can  be
formulated  and  I  do  not  endorse  the  current  degree  of  generality.  Rather,  I  have
highlighted  how  symptoms  with  a  degree  of  generality  can  be  supplemented  by  the
guidance  provided  by  CPPDs.  This  guidance  aspect  helps  symptom  attribution  with
currently  employed  symptoms  and  would  likely  still   provide  guidance  to  an
alternative  set  of  symptoms  formulated  at  an  alternative  set  of  generality.   Directly
describing  the  individual  faces  the  problem  of  either  having  generalised  symptoms
without  the  guidance  provided  from  CPPDs  or  significantly  increasing  complexity
by  formulating  many  new  symptoms  which  are  each  associated  with  more  specific
behaviour.  
5  Broadening  The  Argument  Beyond  ASD
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I  have  argued  that  CPPDs  play  a  valuable  role  in  guiding  the  detection  and
understanding  of  symptoms.  Throughout  my  argument  I  have  employed  ASD  as  an
example.  It  is  now  time  to  argue  that  the  argument  can  be  generalised  to  many
other  CPPDs  although  I  do  not  claim  it  is  generalisable  to  all.  There  may  be  some
cases  where  symptom  attribution  is  so  easy  that  there  is  no  need  for  CPPDs  to
provide  guidance.  For  example,  perhaps  an  individual  repetitively  banging  their  head
against  a  floor  seems  sufficiently  easy  to  spot  regardless  of  any  guidance  supplied
by  CPPDs.  In  other  cases,  a  particular  CPPD  may  provide  relatively  little  guidance.
The  diagnostic  criteria  for  certain  CPPDs  include  very  few  symptoms,  for  example
trichotillomania  (hair  pulling)  and  pica  (eating  food  which  lacks  nutritional  value).
Establishing  that  an  individual  exhibits  two  symptoms  on  the  diagnostic  criteria  of
a  particular  CPPD  provides  little  guidance  if  the  diagnostic  criteria  only  consists  of
three  symptoms.  Perhaps  in  these  cases  CPPDs  do  not  make  much  of  a  helpful
contribution  and  might  not  be  worth  employing.  However,  very  many  CPPDs  are
associated  with  multiple  symptoms  (like  ASD,  schizophrenia  and  bipolar  disorder).
The  argument  developed  here  will  apply  to  all  such  cases.
6  The  Problem  Of  Flawed  Categorical  Polythetic  Psychiatric  Diagnosis
I  now  discuss  a  possible  objection  to  my  argument.  A  critic  could  grant  that
CPPDs  provide  guidance  but  then  claim  that  the  guidance  is  harmful.  Critics  often
claim  that  CPPDs  in  the  DSM  and  ICD  group  together  symptoms  in  ways  which
fail  to  reflect  how  symptoms  actually  cluster  together  in  people  (Cuthbert  &  Insel
[2013],  p.3;  Kinderman  et  al.  [2013],  p.2).  If  so  CPPDs  could  guide  investigation
towards  the  wrong  symptoms.  It  could  guide  investigation  towards  symptoms  which
someone  does  not  have,  potentially  leading  to  them  being  incorrectly  assigned
symptoms  which  they  do  not  have.  Additionally,  it  might  fail  to  guide  toward
symptoms  that  someone  does  have.  
Whilst  this  is  a  legitimate  concern  it  is  important  to  qualify  the  extent  of
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this  problem.  Firstly,  it  is  not  a  problem  which  is  specific  to  CPPDs.  There  are
general  problems,  arising  from  the  theory-laden  nature  of  evidence,  which  are
potentially  applicable  to  all  scientific  theories.  A  flawed  theory  is  likely  to  generate
a  flawed  model.  Consequently,  the  possibility  of  being  flawed  is  insufficient  to
dismiss  all  CPPDs.  There  needs  be  reason  to  believe  particular  CPPDs  are  flawed.  
Secondly,  critics  argue  that  CPPDs  are  flawed  because  people  with  very
heterogeneous  symptoms  can  receive  the  same  CPPD,  but  my  argument  shows  that
covering  heterogeneous  symptoms  does  not  prevent  a  CPPD  providing  helpful
guidance.  I  have  shown  how  a  CPPD  can  provide  guidance  even  though  people
with  the  CPPD  do  not  have  all  the  same  symptoms.  Therefore,  a  CPPD  can
provide  helpful  guidance  despite  covering  individuals  with  heterogeneous  groupings
of  symptoms.  There  will  be  a  limit  to  the  level  of  heterogeneity  before  guidance
starts  being  unhelpful  but  heterogeneity  of  symptom  profiles  does  not  always  entail
that  the  CPPD  is  useless.  Consequently,  critics  of  CPPDs  do  not  merely  need  show
a  particular  CPPD  is  given  to  people  with  heterogeneous  symptoms  but  need  show
that  the  people  who  have  received  the  CPPD  are  so  heterogeneous  that  the  CPPD
no  longer  provides  helpful  guidance.
Some,  however,  do  argue  that  the  current  DSM  (and  very  similar  ICD)  are
so  bad  that  they  are  misleading.  The  Research  Domain  Criteria  project  (known  as
RDoC)  was  set  up  by  the  National  Institute  for  Mental  Health  (the  main  U.S.
government  body  for  mental  health).  The  RDoC  project  assumes  that  most  currently
employed  CPPDs  are  too  heterogeneous  both  causally  and  in  associated  symptoms.
The  RDoC  project  believes  that  the  level  of  heterogeneity  holds  back  causal
investigation.   Consequently,   the   RDoC   project   intends   to   investigate   causes
independently  of  currently  employed  CPPDs  (Cuthbert  &  Insel  [2009],  p.989).  
The  eventual  hope  is  that  the  RDoC  project  will  lead  to  a  new  and  better
nosology  for  psychiatry.  Whether  such  a  future  nosology  will  still  support  CPPDs  is
unclear.  RDoC  literature  generally  favours  moving  towards  a  dimensional  approach
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but  whether  this  will  be  used  alongside  or  instead  of  a  categorical  approach  is
rarely  commented  upon.  Many  of  those  who  advocate  for  employing  a  dimensional
approach  believe  that  dimensional  approaches  should  be  used  alongside  categorical
approaches  (Helzer  et  al.  [2006],  p.1675;  Hudziak  et  al.  [2007],  p.21).  The  aim  of
my  argument  is  not  to  defend  the  DSM  in  its  current  form,  but  rather  to  argue
against  critics  who  claim  that  CPPDs  are  necessarily  superfluous.  I  accept  (though
do  not  endorse)  that  the  current  nosological  system  might  be  flawed,  but  have
shown  here  that  seeking  well  grounded  CPPDs  is  worthwhile.  
If  the  future  consists  of  new,  superior  CPPDs  (enabled  by  RDoC  or  some
other  research  programme)  then  the  benefits  of  CPPDs  that  I  argue  for  here  will
still  be  applicable.  
7  People  Are  Not  Their  Categorical  Polythetic  Psychiatric  Diagnoses
In  this  article  I  have  responded  to  the  concern  that  CPPDs  lack  specificity.  I  have
shown  previously  unrecognised  advantages  to  this  lack  of  specificity.  However,
having  argued  for  the  importance  of  CPPDs  I  now  explain  why,  on  the  account  I
have  developed,  they  are  not  sufficient  but  need  supplementing  with  more  detailed
models.  
I  have  employed  Giere's  account  to  portray  CPPDs  as  abstract  models  which
are  analogous  to  Giere’s  notion  of  scientific  theories.  Giere  demarcates  theories
from  models  and  physical  systems.  A  model  has  additional  detail  which  is  not
present  within  the  theory.  The  physical  system  is  the  thing  which  is   being
modelled.  Following  this,  I  demarcated  CPPDs,  which  do  not  specify  the  specific
symptoms  someone  exhibits,  from  the  more  detailed  model  of  a  CPPD  which
specifies   which   symptoms   a   particular   individual   has.  Additionally,   I   have
demarcated  both  these  from  the  actual  person.  CPPDs  are  too  abstract  to  directly
resemble  specific  people  whilst  modelling  a  CPPD  onto  a  particular  individual
results  only  in  degrees  of  resemblance  to  that  specific  person.  Giere  writes  that
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theories  ‘cannot  by  themselves  be  used  to  make  any  direct  claims  about  the  world ’
(Giere  [2010],  p.270).  When  thought  of  in  terms  of  CPPDs  this  acts  as  a  clear
statement  that  CPPDs  do  not  resemble  actual  individuals.  Through  employing
Giere’s  account,  the  framework  for  understanding  CPPDs  developed  here  highlights
many  of  their  limitations  that  other  authors  have  also  highlighted  (Johnstone  [2014],
p.275;  Lingiardi  et  al.  [2015],  p.110;  McWilliams  [2005],  p.143;  Vanheule  [2017],
p.275).  
My  argument  shows  that  CPPDs  need  supplementing  with  models  which
specify  which  symptoms  are  present  and  with  approaches  which  model  other
aspects  of  the  individual  such  as  their  past  life  history,  their  current  life  situation
or  aspects  of  their  personality  which  are  not  symptoms.  Formulations  would  be  one
means  of  establishing  this   information.   A  formulation  is   intended  to  give  a
description   of   a   specific   person,   specifying  which  symptoms  they  have   and
specifying  many  other  aspects  of  the  individual.  A  CPPD  does  not  specify  which
symptoms  are  present  whereas  a  formulation  is  a  means  of  establishing  a  less
abstract  model  which  would  specify  which  symptoms  are  present  (and  much  else
besides).  Given  the  advantages  to  knowing  which  specific  symptoms  an  individual
exhibits  there  is  good  reason  to  supplement  CPPDs  with  formulations.
8  Conclusion
In  this  paper  I  have  responded  to  the  argument  that  CPPDs  are  superfluous.  Critics
claim  CPPDs  are  superfluous  because  they  only  associate  an  individual  with  a
range  of  symptoms  rather  than  specify  which  symptoms  are  present.  
In  response  to  this  concern  I  have  framed  CPPDs  as  analogous  to  Giere's
account  of  scientific  theories.  I  portray  CPPDs  as  abstract  models  which  guide  the
building  of  more  specific  models.  In  doing  this  I  have  highlighted  three  previously
unrecognised  advantages  to  employing  CPPDs.  Firstly,  the  polythetic  diagnostic
criteria  of  CPPDs  can  help  guide  symptom  attribution.  Secondly,  a  CPPD  can  help
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encourage  awareness  that  symptoms  can  change  and  can  guide  attention  to  what
changes  may  have  occurred.  Thirdly,  a  CPPD  can  indicate  more  likely  ways  a
symptom  will  manifest  as  a  behaviour.  This  suggests  that  CPPDs  have  advantages
which  have  been  unrecognised  by  their  critics.  Consequently,  I  suggest  that  there  is
good  reason  to  keep  employing  CPPDs.  I  have,  however,  acknowledged  that  CPPDs
have  significant  limitations  and  that  they  should  be  supplemented  with  formulations.
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